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Abstract The Westminster model for parliamentary democracy has 
served as the template for one of the world’s most widely used forms of 
responsible government.  The model owes its popularity to its cultural 
adaptiveness, which stems largely from the original model’s reliance on 
pragmatic conventions to resolve fundamental constitutional disputes.  
However, as Walter Bagehot noted 150 years ago, every replication can 
lead to ‘copying errors’.  Fiji’s 2013 constitution was intended to restore 
Fiji to parliamentary democracy after the 2006 military coup.  It has been 
controversial for many reasons including the significant changes it made 
to previous iterations of the Westminster model over the 50 years since 
Fiji’s independence especially the 1997 constitution which was itself a 
consequence of a military coup.  This article tests the relevance of 
Bagehot’s concerns in contemporary Fiji as they appear in the 2013 
Constitution, with a focus on Head of State-Parliament relations. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 10 2020, Fiji celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of its independence, 
although regrettably the shadow of the Covid-19 pandemic muted the public 
celebration of this national milestone.  Independence was itself necessary because 96 
years earlier, a body of high-ranking Fijian chiefs under the leadership of Ratu Seru 
Epenisa Cakobau signed a deed ceding the archipelago to Queen Victoria, thus 
bringing it into the British Empire as a colony.  Amongst the many influences 
imported into during the near century of colonial rule was the Westminster system of 
responsible government.  This approach to democratic government has proved fairly 
durable, having survived three military and one civilian coups over the past 50 years.  
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This not to say that the democratic process and the Westminster were unscarred by 
these deep political and social upheavals.  Nevertheless, as Fiji embarks on the next 
half century, the parliamentary system remains clearly Westminster in style.  This 
article reviews some of the adaptations that have helped this introduced democratic 
form to survive through the lens of the changing relationship between the head of 
state and the Parliament. 
Seven years before Cakobau signed the Deed of Cession, Walter Bagehot published 
his political classic, The English Constitution.1  The work is significant as the first 
comprehensive political assessment of the Westminster parliamentary system and, as 
an analytical pathbreaker, helped to set public expectations for the last 150 years on 
how the Westminster model should operate.  His work explained the strengths of 
Britain’s constitutional monarchy in contrast with the American republican system.  
As a member of the Liberal Party, Bagehot supported the democratisation of Britain 
but with strong support for a Tory view of the evolutionary development of the state.  
He viewed the Westminster system through the lens of the unwritten conventions 
that served as the constitutional sinews linking the sovereign (head of state) with the 
executive and the legislative arms of government.  Indeed, Bagehot argued that these 
conventions were so vital that he claimed ‘hundreds of errors have been made in 
copying the English constitution’ through not understanding their importance.2 
The extent of the risks posed by adopting and adapting the Westminster 
parliamentary model without full regard for Bagehot’s constitutional conventions can 
be debated.  There are any number of historical, cultural and circumstantial reasons 
why the basic Westminster model has had to be modified to flower in foreign lands.  
Arguably, the success of the Westminster model as, perhaps, the most widely used 
parliamentary system across the globe is due to its flexibility and adaptiveness.  A key 
analytic to test the validity of the translation of the Westminster conventions into 
black letter law (constitutional or statutory) is how well the codification preserves the 
objective of a convention or strengthens other equally important democratic aims.  
This paper tests the relevance of Bagehot’s concerns today by reviewing the 




1 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution. New York: Dolphin Books, 1961 [1867]. 
2 Bagehot, The English Constitution, p. 248. 
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the 2013 Constitution.3  While this constitution is important as the precursor to 
enabling the 2014 election and return to parliamentary democracy, it sheds some 
useful light on Bagehot’s ‘copying errors’ in the adaptation of the Westminster model 
to post-coup Fiji. 
THE WESTMINSTER MODEL 
From independence in October 1970, Fiji has retained the core elements of the 
Westminster model of responsible government, including a dual executive.  The 
Westminster model’s basic features include a popularly elected Parliament to which 
the executive is responsible.  This description actually covers all ‘responsible 
Government’ systems where the executive arm of government is responsible to a 
legislature that enjoys constitutional supremacy.  What distinguishes the 
Westminster model from other forms of responsible Government, such as that of 
Norway, for example, is the relationship between the legislature and the executive.  
From the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the convention has been accepted, and 
followed, that Ministers of the Crown could only be drawn from the membership of 
the legislature (the House of Commons and House of Lords).  In Norway, Ministers 
may be drawn from outside the membership of the Storting (Parliament), although 
they remain responsible to it both individually and collectively.  Moreover, Article 62 
of the Norwegian Constitution requires that any Minister drawn from the Storting 
must leave the chamber and not take part in its proceedings.  The parliamentary 
vacancy thus created is filled by the next available candidate from the party list. 
In the Westminster model, Ministers not only must be Members of the legislature but 
they retain their parliamentary places and their voting rights in the chamber.  The 
importance of this convention cementing the close relationship between the 
legislative arm and the executive can be seen in its treatment outside the United 
Kingdom.  In most Westminster jurisdictions, this convention is codified as a 




3 The half century of Fijian independence has been marked by coups and extra-constitutional abuses of 
power which are too complex to cover in brief.  Without belittling these influences, this article is 
primary concerned with the transition from the 1997 Constitution, which was the main motivation 
institutionally for the changes that came through the 2013 document.  
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states that ‘no Minister of State shall hold office for a longer period than three 
months unless he is or becomes a senator or a member of the House of 
Representatives’.  Of course, for the brief period where a Minister is trying to find a 
seat in the Parliament, they cannot exercise any of the rights of a Member, such as 
speaking on the floor or voting. 
This provision has been a feature of every constitution of Fiji since 1970.  The 1970 
Constitution followed the Australian formula at s 74(4), stating that a Minister ‘not a 
member of either House of Parliament at the date of his appointment as a Minister, 
he shall vacate his office as a Minister on the expiration of three months’.  Article 
95(1) of the 2013 Constitution puts the same provision more directly, stating ‘a 
Minister must be a member of Parliament’.  Significantly, this drafting did not leave 
open the option of a non-Member for even a limited, interim period.  The different 
wording between the 1970 and 2013 constitutions invites further attention to the 
parliamentary qualification for a ministerial position.  Under the 1970 and 1997 
Constitutions, it was possible for a Government to secure ministerial ‘talent’ through 
appointments to the Senate.  The only path to a ministerial office, except possibly 
that of Attorney-General,4 under the present Constitution is through the ballot box. 
The supremacy of Parliament is critical to any responsible Government system 
including the Westminster model.  Basically, this means that the executive arm of 
government is obliged to answer to the legislative arm for its actions, which has the 
capacity to impose sanctions for perceived breaches.  The 2013 Constitution makes 
the connection explicit: ‘Governments must have the confidence of Parliament’ (s 90).  
Any Government that is not supported by the Parliament loses office.  The general 
obligation of accountability clear at s 91(2), which asserts ‘Cabinet members are 
accountable individually and collectively to Parliament, for the exercise of their 
powers and the performance of their functions’.  This obligation appeared in the 1970 
Constitution as ‘the Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to Parliament’ [s 75(2)].  
The responsibility to report to the Parliament is clear but the capacity of the 




4 Section 96(3) provides for the appointment of a non-Member as Attorney-General under some 
circumstances.  
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Accountability is not the same as responsibility.  Responsibility demands that there 
should be consequences if the Parliament does not like the account it receives from 
the Minister or the Government.  The 2013 Constitution departs to some extent from 
Westminster conventions by making the Government as a whole responsible to the 
Parliament collectively through the Prime Minister but failing to provide for individual 
ministerial responsibility.  None of the three ways that the Constitution sets out in s 
95(3) for a Minister to lose office includes a vote of no confidence in the Minister.  
This was a continuation of the absence of constitutionally mandated individual 
ministerial responsibility in the 1970 Constitution (s 74).  In both Constitutions, the 
only available specified sanction (want of confidence) was against the Government as 
a whole.  The same constitutional arrangement has applied, for example, in Samoa, 
which was the first Pacific Island state to draft a post-independence Westminster 
system.  The 1960 Constitution provides that Ministers can only be removed by the 
Prime Minister and all are removed when the Prime Minister resigns or is removed 
[art 33(3)]. 
DUAL EXECUTIVE—THE CROWN-IN-COUNCIL AND THE CROWN-IN-
PARLIAMENT 
All responsible Government systems separate the office of the head of state from 
that of the head of government.  In the Westminster model, this distinction arose 
from the Parliament’s gradual taking over the exercise of the sovereign’s executive 
powers.  As the monarch lost a capacity to exercise autonomous authority, the 
Parliament had to organise itself to carry out effectively and competently the 
responsibilities it took over from the crown.  Conventions converged around a 
principal Minister, who, having the support of a majority of the Parliament, was able 
to deliver the finances to enable the sovereign to provide for the administration of 
the state.  Thus, in the evolution of the Westminster system, two centres of executive 
authority became apparent—one that represented the permanence of the state and 
another that implemented the policies of the Government of the day.  In order for 
this dual leadership arrangement to work, the sovereign as head of state was reduced 
to a largely ceremonial public role while the head of Government took on the 
practical day-to-day responsibilities of making and implementing policy.  As Bagehot 
pointed out, the ceremonial and efficient distribution of authority in Westminster’s 
dual executive contrasted significantly with systems such the United States where the 
two are combined in the single office of an executive head of state. 
It is often overlooked that the evolution of parliamentary democracy in Great Britain 
by retaining a constitutionally limited monarch created a sovereign with two not-
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always distinct crowns.  In legal terms, the head of state has a role as the ‘Sovereign-
in-Parliament’ as well as the more familiar role as the ‘Sovereign-in-Council’.5  The 
modern Westminster head of state’s role as titular head of the executive arm of 
government (that is, as the Crown-in-Council) is today relative unproblematic 
politically.  The executive powers of the head of state are exercised solely on advice.  
The advice in-Council is directive and formally comes from or through an institution 
headed by the Prime Minister usually called Executive Council.  The Sovereign-In-
Parliament, by contrast, involves the sovereign’s separate role in passing legislation.  
Related to this is the area of discretion regarding the Parliament that the sovereign 
has retained under the prerogative powers of the Crown.  Classically, these are 
located in what are commonly known as the sovereign’s ‘reserve powers’.  Yet, 
despite the rarity of use in modern times, the reserve powers have proved 
contentious both in theory and in practice.  Contemporary democratic theory 
struggles with the use of unaccountable public power.  Indeed, translating these 
conventions into black letter constitutional provisions has proved particularly 
challenging for this reason. 
Nevertheless, the existence of some independent discretion is a logical consequence 
of the separation of the two roles.  If the reserve powers did not embody some 
discretion by the head of state, they would be subject to direction indistinguishable 
from in-Council advice.  Australia’s former High Court Chief Justice, Sir Harry Gibbs, 
has presented a simple and democratic case for why the reserve powers cannot be 
subordinated to Executive direction.  He asserts that the reserve powers play an 
important role in preserving the institutional distinction between the legislative and 
executive arms of government in the Westminster system of responsible 
Government, writing: 
The ‘reserve powers’, are designed to ensure that the powers of the 




5 The precise terms will depend on the particular jurisdiction so may be identified as Queen-in-
Parliament, President-in-Parliament, Governor-in-Parliament, etc. as appropriate.  Basically, all are 
variations of the concepts of the Sovereign-in-Parliament and Sovereign-in-Council. 
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principles of responsible government and representative democracy, or 
in other words to ensure that the Ministry is responsible to Parliament.6 
THE SOVEREIGN-IN-PARLIAMENT  
Fundamental to Gibbs’ argument is that the head of state retains some independent 
responsibilities for Parliament that should not be captured entirely by direction from 
the head of Government (the executive).  The first point is fairly easy to establish for 
Fiji.  The British sovereign’s conventional role has been codified constitutionally in the 
definition of the Parliament.  Section 30 of the 1970 Constitution stated that: ‘There 
shall be a Parliament for Fiji which shall consist of Her Majesty, a House of 
Representatives and a Senate’.  The 1997 Constitution’s definition (s 45) was similar, 
allowing for the republican change, ‘The power to make laws for the State vests in a 
Parliament consisting of the President, the House of Representatives and the Senate’.  
The wording in s 46(1) of the 2013 Constitution for this relationship is couched in 
slightly different terms, ‘The authority and power to make laws for the State is vested 
in Parliament consisting of the members of Parliament and the President’.  The 
changed wording may not be significant in terms of the Westminster convention on 
the composition of ‘the Parliament’ but it presents something of a challenge for 
constitutional interpretation.  
A few examples from Fiji’s Westminster neighbours can help to illustrate the issue.  
Samoa’s Constitution (art 42) states ‘Parliament of Samoa, which shall consist of the 
Head of State and the Legislative Assembly’.  Australia’s constitutional definition (s 1) 
is ‘the legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal 
Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of 
Representatives, and which is hereinafter called The Parliament’.  New Zealand’s s 
14(1) is almost identical with allowance for having a unicameral legislature defining 
the ‘Parliament of New Zealand, which shall consist of the Sovereign in right of New 




6 The Rt Hon. Sir Harry Gibbs, ‘Reserve Powers of the Governor-General and the Provisions for 
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which may have been the result of some casual drafting, is that it includes a 
definitional circularity. 
At first glance, the law-making power being vested in ‘Parliament consisting of the 
members of Parliament and the President’ may not give cause for pausing.  However, 
as the former Clerk of the New Zealand, David McGee, has written with regard to the 
New Zealand Parliament: 
The Parliament of New Zealand has only one function, and that is to make 
laws.  Whenever ‘Parliament’ acts, its act has the force of law—as an Act 
of Parliament.  There are communications between the Governor-
General and the House of Representatives on other matters than laws, 
but the two constituents act together as Parliament only to make laws.7 
The 2013 Constitution has no word anywhere in the document to describe the 
institution that exists when the President is not part of the Parliament; that is the set 
of institutions normally referred to as the legislature.  All the definitions in the 
constitutions noted above have some such descriptors including the Fijian 
constitutions of 1970 and 1997.  The significance of this drafting oversight is 
explained by McGee as follows: ‘The functions of the Parliament and of the House are 
not identical.  Each constituent part of the legislature has a different role from the 
other’.8  And, in fact, these other functions, which Bagehot identified as the 
Parliament’s ‘non-legislative’ functions,9 are what most people believe the Parliament 
does, such as providing and supporting a Government, holding the Government to 
account, representing public opinion and informing the nation’s debate on key issues.  
While the public is scarcely aware of the distinction that McGee makes, it is important 
that the legislature have an institutional appreciation of its own identity separate 




7 David McGee (edited by Mary Harris and David Wilson, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (4th 
ed.). Auckland: Oratia Books, 2017, p. 2. 
8 McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, p. 2. 
9 Bagehot, The English Constitution, pp. 171-5. 
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THE RESERVE POWERS AND THE SOVEREIGN-IN-PARLIAMENT 
McGee’s point about the House of Representatives not being the entirety of the New 
Zealand Parliament also applies to the head of state in its role as a component of the 
Parliament.  Regrettably, public awareness of the role of the head of state has been 
captured by the historical struggle to democratise the monarchy, so that any 
continuation of real power tends to be portrayed as ‘unfinished business’.  The 
political puppetry of the Sovereign-in-Council serves as the model for expectations of 
the Sovereign-in-Parliament.  Unsurprisingly therefore, in modern Westminster 
systems it can be difficult to switch perspectives to argue, as Sir Harry Gibbs does, 
and regard the Sovereign-in-Parliament as a protector for the legislative body against 
the executive.  Yet the areas of discretion still owned by the head of state can be seen 
in precisely this light. 
In the United Kingdom, the principal recognised reserve powers include 1) the 
appointment of a Prime Minister; 2) prorogation and summoning of Parliament; and 
3) assent to legislation.10  While the use of these powers is supported as convention 
in the United Kingdom, the same powers are generally constitutionally codified 
elsewhere.  However, the use of these powers and the circumstances where they 
might be used by the head of state are subject to much the same conventions as in 
the United Kingdom.  The 2013 Constitution also provides for the codification of these 
powers but the question that then needs to be addressed is the discretion available 
to the President for their use. 
APPOINTMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER 
This role is not a power for the President under the 2013 Constitution, although it 
was in the 1970 and 1997 documents.  Section 72(2) of the 1970 Constitution both 
codified the power and identified its use as discretionary, stating that:  
The Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, shall 




10 Gail Bartlett and Michael Everett, ‘The Royal Prerogative’. House of Commons Library, Briefing 
Paper, Number 03861, 17 August 2017, p10. Accessed at: 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN03861 
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who appears to him best able to command the support of the majority of 
the members of that House. 
The 1997 Constitution’s s 98 repeated this wording almost unchanged.  However, 
when the 2013 Constitution treated this process, the selection of the Prime Minister 
did not involve the President at any level.  If the general election returns a party with 
‘more than 50% of the total number of seats’, s 93(2) specifies that the party leader 
‘assumes office as the Prime Minister by taking before the President the oath or 
affirmation of allegiance and office’.  The President does not have any discretion 
although the same section provides that administering the oath cannot be delegated 
or refused by the President. 
However, if the s 93(2) condition is not met, then s 93(3) provides that ‘at the first 
sitting of Parliament, the Speaker must call for nominations from members of 
Parliament’.  If there is only one nomination, no election is needed.  Otherwise, the 
Members are balloted to see if any Member can secure ‘more than 50%’ support.  
There is a limit to the number of ballots that can be held.  If no one can claim majority 
support after three votes, ‘the Speaker shall notify the President ... and the President 
shall, within 24 hours of the notification, dissolve Parliament and issue the writ for a 
general election’.  Even a vacancy does not create an opportunity for presidential 
discretion.  Section 93(5) states that ‘if a vacancy arises in the office of the Prime 
Minister under subsection (4), then the Speaker shall immediately convene 
Parliament and call for nominations from members of Parliament’ where the post-
election arrangements apply. 
While the President is frozen out of any role in resolving disputed claims to the prime 
ministerial office, the lack of discretion has its own consequences for political parties.  
Unlike the recent experience in Australia with the revolving door to the prime 
ministerial office, internal party disputes over leadership in Fiji cannot be resolved 
without going through the constitutionally prescribed processes, should a party ‘spill’ 
cost a Prime Minister the support of his party.  Section 93(6) appears to prevent any 
party spill imposing a resisted vacancy.  It asserts that the ‘Prime Minister shall serve 
for the full term of Parliament, unless dismissed in a motion of no confidence under 
section 94, and shall not be otherwise dismissed’.  A Prime Minster who refused to 
resign on losing a party room leadership vote could not be dismissed by the 
President.  Of course, the party could expel the loser to ensure that a Prime Minister 
who lost the vote was ineligible to sit in Parliament. 
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A ‘PRESIDENTIAL’ PRIME MINISTER? 
The President’s role with regard to other ministerial appoints is even more remote.  
As noted above and rather at odds with standard Westminster practice, Ministers are 
not directly responsible to Parliament.  Moreover, s 92(3) states explicitly that the 
Prime Minister ‘appoints’ and ‘dismisses’ Ministers.  This may not seem surprising at 
first blush, since generally it is accepted that Prime Ministers make these 
determinations around the Westminster world.  However, its significance becomes 
clearer when contrasted with the more conventional wording regarding this 
relationship.  For example, s 99(1) of the 1997 Constitution states, ‘The President 
appoints and dismisses other Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister’.  Until the 
2013 Constitution, Ministers were clearly Ministers of state, having received their 
appointments to office from the head of state, the Governor-General or the 
President. 
Thus, technically, the usual Westminster description of the Prime Minister as ‘primus 
inter pares’—the first amongst equals – does not apply in Fiji today.  Arguably, under 
the 2013 Constitution, the Ministers are subordinates of the Prime Minister.  In 
effect, formally Fiji’s responsible Government system lies somewhere between a 
traditional Westminster system where all Ministers are formally equal in rank (but 
not in precedent or status) and the American system where all the political heads of 
departments are subordinates of the President.  This locates the current Fijian 
parliamentary system in a hybrid grey area somewhere between the Westminster 
model and the American model of executive autonomy.  It is closer to the 
Westminster model but clearly the 2013 Constitution has altered significantly the 
relationship between the legislative and executive arms of government and between 
both of these and the state of Fiji. 
SUMMONING, PROROGUING AND DISSOLVING THE PARLIAMENT 
The 2013 Constitution has codified the conventions regarding the head of state and 
the several stages of determining when a Parliament is convened and is dissolved.  
These powers are assigned to the President but with some significant qualifications 
on their use.  Section 67(1) provides for the President to summon the Parliament but 
the discretion for using this power is limited to the obligation to issue the summons 
‘no later than 14 days after the announcement of the results of the general election’.  
The other occasion when the President might summon the Parliament is after a 
prorogation ‘on the advice of the Prime Minister’ but with the qualification that ‘no 
longer than 6 months must elapse between the end of one session and the start of 
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another’ [s 67(3)]. 
This provision does open the possibility that the President may be able use his powers 
without advice.  While this provision appears prescriptive, there is an ambiguity about 
how the President might act if the Prime Minister failed to give the required advice 
within the required timeframe.  The President could feel legally bound to honour the 
constitutional obligation on him to summon the Parliament back into session and so 
act without advice.  Alternatively, the President might retreat behind the need to act 
only on advice and refuse to issue the summons.  Presumably, the President’s 
decision on such an occasion would hang on the circumstances as to why a Prime 
Minister would want to refuse the advice to recall Parliament.  There is an argument 
that an internally divided Government that wants to have an extended period 
without the additional pressure of parliamentary scrutiny should be forced back into 
Parliament so that the head of state can be certain of the level of the support the 
Government enjoys in the chamber. 
There is another constitutional empowerment for summoning the Parliament that 
appears completely obligatory.  Yet, the circumstances when it might be used seems 
so controversial that it might be queried why the provision exists.  Section 67(4) 
allows the Opposition to give directive advice to the President requiring him to 
summon a prorogued Parliament back into session.  It states that if ‘the President 
receives a request in writing from not less than one-third of the members of 
Parliament requesting that Parliament be summoned ... the President shall summon 
Parliament to meet’.  The basis for petitioning the head of state would be ‘to consider 
without delay a matter of public importance’. 
The democratic virtue of s 67(4) is clear.  A Government under stress may not wish to 
be forced to defend its decisions in Parliament.  This provision offers a parliamentary 
path around executive obstructionism.  The politics of using this provision could be 
fraught, nonetheless.  A Prime Minister having a majority might regard the recall of 
the Parliament against his wishes as a loss of control over the chamber.  Another 
possibility is that the request to the President may not be as directive as it appears.  
On prime ministerial advice or on his own cognisance, the President may decide that 
the petition lacks merit in raising a matter of sufficient public importance.  A post-
Cyclone Winston attempt to use this provision in 2016 demonstrated both its 
potential for political mischief as well as some resistance to regarding the presidential 
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response as automatic as its users might wish.11 
The presidential power of prorogation is provided for under s 58(2) but using the 
power seems carefully circumscribed by the words ‘acting on the advice of the Prime 
Minister’.  Again, there is an ‘however’.  There is little doubt that a President could 
not use the power to prorogue without advice.  The more important democratic issue 
may be whether the President can refuse advice to prorogue.  There are examples 
where a Government under pressure has sought a prorogation in order to avoid 
parliamentary scrutiny and the head of state has resisted the attempt.12  
Interestingly, such a controversial exercise of discretion by the head of state may not 
even be subject to review by the courts.  The proceedings of the Parliament are 
protected by privilege, which could deter the courts from giving a ruling on the 
constitutional validity of any action.  If a court viewed the process of prorogation as a 
proceeding of Parliament, the decision might be privileged. 
The President’s power to dissolve the Parliament is again qualified by explicit 
reference to acting on prime ministerial advice but any scope for discretion is 
severely restricted by an extra time dimension that does not apply to prorogation.  
Section 58(3) allows the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister to 
dissolve ‘only after a lapse of 3 years and 6 months from the date of its first meeting 
after a general election of the members of Parliament’.  Given a long-time practice of 
allowing Governments some flexibility regarding the precise election date, this 
limitation is scarcely likely to cause difficulties for either side. 
ASSENT TO LEGISLATION 




11 See Vijay Narayan, ‘Opposition Leader Calls on President to Call Parliament’. FijiVillage, 15 March 
2016. Accessed at: http://fijivillage.com/news-feature/Opposition-Leader-calls-on-President-to-call-
parliament-r5sk92; Bruce Hill, ‘Fiji's President refuses to call special cyclone sitting of parliament’. 
ABC Pacific Beat, 17 March 2016. Accessed at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/programs/pacific-
beat/2016-03-17/fijis-president-refuses-to-call-special-cyclone/7255914 . 
12 See Don Morris, ‘The Perils of Defining the Reserve Powers of the Crown’. Paper presented at The 
Twenty Eighth Conference of The Samuel Griffith Society, 12-14 August, 2016. Adelaide, South 
Australia. 
  
VOL 35 NO 1 WINTER/SPRING 2020 
21
Sovereign-in-Parliament, it is scarcely surprising this convention is codified 
constitutionally in most Westminster jurisdictions.  The President’s assent to 
legislation has been incorporated in the 2013 Constitution in a way that appears to 
have obviated any discretion.  Section 48 requires all Bills that have passed the 
Parliament to be presented to the President for assent.  This section also stipulates 
that the President ‘must provide his or her assent’ within seven days or without his 
assent ‘the Bill will be taken to have been assented to’ after the seven days period.  
The value of a week’s time for reflection appears to lack purpose.  There may some 
political embarrassment if a President refuses assent but in which direction?  Would 
the public reaction favour the Prime Minister or the President?  Much would depend 
on the issue and the public’s view of it and the two actors who had engineered the 
dispute.  Presumably a dispute over assent would not arise in ignorance.   
A Government should be aware of the President’s views if the obligations of s 92(2) to 
‘keep the President generally informed about the issues relating to the governance of 
Fiji’ is maintained properly.  This section is what allows the President to exercise 
Bagehot’s three rights of the head of state—the right to be consulted, the right to 
encourage, the right to warn.13  The Prime Minister has no equals in the cabinet, 
especially under a constitution that makes subordinates of all his or her Ministers.  
Thus, there may be some democratic value for the dual executives discussing the 
affairs of state from their differing perspectives for the benefit of the nation.  The 
power to refuse assent has not been used in the United Kingdom since Queen Anne in 
1708, so the real benefit of this power cannot be in the threat of its use.  Rather, it 
lies in the need to explain the Bill in the regular meetings leading up to the request 
for assent, where the head of state can use Bagehot’s three rights to persuade a 
Government to avoid rash or ill-conceived legislation.  The perfunctory role for the 
President in the assent process would appear to undermine the opportunity for the 





13 Bagehot, The English Constitution, p. 124. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Walter Bagehot had grounds for his assessment that errors of consistency would be 
made in copying the Westminster constitution without properly understanding these 
unwritten conventions both in historical context and in relationship to the overall 
operation of the system.  Nevertheless, all the deviations from the basic conventions 
of the Westminster model cannot be regarded as ‘errors’ just because, in some 
interpretation of Bagehot’s view, the conventions have not been maintained in 
precisely the same way today across all Westminster jurisdictions.  Historically, 
adaptation was necessary to meet the differing experiences, histories, and cultural 
foundations in the countries embracing the Westminster parliamentary model.  
Codifying the Westminster conventions regarding the traditional reserve powers of 
the Sovereign-in-Parliament has proved difficult in the localisation of the 
Westminster model.  The process of decolonisation was generally more focused on 
the Sovereign-in-Council constitutional arrangements than those governing the 
Sovereign-in-Parliament.  The perceived priority was to provide for stable 
Government rather than fine-tuning a relationship between the head of state and 
Parliament that few understood, assuming it was either uncomplicated or irrelevant.   
Post-colonial attitudes generally continued to favour the executive arm of 
government over the Parliament.  In consequence, public expectations have been 
fostered (especially by political leaders) that the head of state is essentially an 
executive office that democracy requires to be a mere ceremonial cypher acting only 
under the direction the Government of the day.  Indeed, there appears to have been 
a progression in favour of the Government and against parliamentary oversight with 
each redrafting of Fiji’s constitutional foundations.  The 2013 Constitution 
demonstrates this trend rather clearly.  The President’s discretion as head of state 
with regard to the exercise of reserve powers has been significantly diminished.  Sir 
Harry Gibbs’ concern that the codification of the reserve powers of the head of state 
would diminish the capacity of the Sovereign-in-Parliament to protect to the 
Parliament from executive over-reach appears to be confirmed by the 2013 
Constitution, although earlier constitutions had set the trend toward a totally 
ceremonial office. 
The degree to which any of these developments matter to good governance comes 
back to the reasons why the Westminster conventions were developed.  Historically, 
the objective has been to secure a balance between ruling authority and the interests 
of the people.  Bagehot argued there was a need to find some stability between the 
continuing interest of the state and the more ephemeral interests of governments 
pursuing public popularity.  The head of state moderated these tensions by lending 
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the legitimacy of the state to the acts of Government while serving to preserve some 
of Parliament’s independence from complete executive dominance.  The American 
solution was to divide the legislative and executive roles completely and so protect 
each so that each arm of government could check and balance the powers of the 
other.  Sir Harry Gibbs supported Bagehot, arguing that the Westminster model 
worked as long as the head of state was able to preserve the conventions critical to 
the protection of the Parliament. 
Has the constitutional weakening of the independent authority of the President in Fiji 
crossed a line?  Bagehot would almost certainly respond ‘yes’ but his own argument 
could be used against him.  The risks to the democratic balance depend on whether 
the strengthening of the executive has been offset by compensatory strengthening of 
the mechanisms for executive oversight and responsibility.  This paper does not 
explore the possible non-parliamentary options for achieving such a democratic re-
balancing.  The argument herein is that some of the key traditional elements of 
parliamentary restraint on the executive have been altered in the 2013 Constitution, 
including even those limited checks that depend on the head of state.  Further 
research will be necessary to assess whether legal and administrative machinery 
developed in the 2013 Constitution provides sufficient redress for these 
parliamentary losses. 
